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, A simple enciphering technique that can be used to encode sensitive
l
data in computer systems is described. This cipher has properties that 
make it  possible to do editing on data within the computer without decoding. 
Thus, the key need not be available to the computer nor anyone who has 
access to the computer system since the data can easily enter and leave 
the system in ciphered form. It need only appear deciphered at its origin 
or its destination by use of a very simple ciphering procedure.
Requirements for computational cryptography are also discussed 
along with a short review of cryptographic techniques that have already 
been used for computer systems. F inally, some problems that s t i l l  remain 
unsolved w ill be illustrated.
A HOMOPHONIC CIPHER FOR COMPUTATIONAL CRYPTOGRAPHY*
1. Introduction
Computational cryptography deals with the storage and processing 
o f sensitive information in computer systems by enciphering. Sensitive 
information is information that for one reason or another must be protected 
from being disclosed to individuals without proper authorization. The 
need for systems to be secure from unauthorized access to sensitive informa- 
tion has been well documented. Cryptographic techniques appear to be 
one of the most simple and secure methods of providing this much needed 
protection.
In the next section the requirements for computational cryptography 
w ill be discussed, especially with regard to the differences from communica­
tion cryptography; second, a short review of the cryptographic techniques 
that have been suggested for computational cryptography; third, a review of 
some standard cryptanalysis techniques; fourth, a homophonie cipher w ill 
be described; and fin a lly , some additional problems associated with computa­
tional cryptography w ill be discussed.
2. Requirements for Computational Cryptography
Cryptography has been used for ages as a technique for concealing 
the informational contents of messages. The use of cryptanalytic techniques 
combined with the availab ility  of high speed electronic equipment have made 
both encipherment and cryptanalysis very sophisticated endeavors indeed. For
•k
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2this reason, simple ciphers can no longer be used to provide a great deal of 
security. This carries over to computational cryptography also. Moreover, 
there are a number of desirable features that any ciphers to be used in 
computer systems should have. These include:
1* Encipherment and decipherment should be simple. That is , the
computational complexity o f enciphering and deciphering information 
should be minimal.
2. The effective  ab ility  to not be broken should be high. As the 
sensitivity  of the information increases a cipher that is more 
d ifficu lt  to break should be available for use.
3. The cipher should be independent of message length. Messages 
can be even one character in length.
4. Small errors should not cause large losses of information. I f a 
small amount is ciphered incorrectly it  should not make a large 
block of information undecipherable.
5. Information should remain integral through editing of the 
ciphered text. The cipher should be such that the normal editing 
functions of deleting, inserting and moving strings of information 
(such as would occur in a dynamic data-base) can be performed 
without destroying the information contained in the ciphered text.
6. The cipher should not increase the length of the message excessively.
7. The cipher should be of such a nature that security can be main­
tained even though the cryptanalyst knows the ciphering system 
but not the key.
3There are in addition to these desirable features a number of problems 
peculiar to computational cryptography. These w ill be discussed in the 
last section.
3, Cryptographic Techniques that Have Been Suggested for Computational 
Cryptography
The major thrust, so far, in computational cryptography has been 
to provide a cipher key to the computer and let it  encipher information that 
enters the system, and also decipher and reencipher information as it is 
processed by the machine. The ciphers suggested include: simple substitu­
tion schemes, arithmetic schemes ( i . e . ,  adding or multiplying by a constant, 
or base conversion), logica l schemes (e .g .,  exclusiv e -o r ), and transposition
schemes. These have been described quite thoroughly by Krishnamurthy,^ and 
9 10Van Tassel. *
Some of these ciphers are too easily broken by the most elementary 
cryptanalytic techniques and others are too computationally complex to be 
implemented for use in computers. A ll fa i l  to have some of the desirable 
features listed above.
4. Standard Cryptanalytic Techniques
It is not the purpose here to describe in great detail the 
cryptanalytic techniques that can be used to break a cipher. The reader 
interested in this topic is referred to G aines.^ i t  is only intended to 
suggest what types of information remain visib le  after the original text 
has been enciphered.
For the most part cyrptanalytic clues are gained from the informa­
tion inherent in the structure of the language such as frequency information
4which is extremely hard to remove. Simple substitution, for example, 
leaves for easy analysis a ll single le tter , and multiple letter frequencies, 
doublet and reversal frequencies, as well as contact variety information. 
Figure 1 is representative of this information for a standard text.
5. Homophonic Ciphers
A homophonic cipher is a substitution cipher in which a given 
character may have any of a number of d ifferent representations. Figure 2 
gives one such cipher and a sample message using i t .  Note that the cipher- 
text for E, for instance, varies from substitution to substitution, Kahn12 
notes that the fir s t  known Western instance "occurs in a cipher that the 
Duchy of Mantua prepared in 1401 for correspondence with one Simone de Crema. 
Each of the plaintext vowels has several possible equivalents. . .That the 
homophones were applied to vowels, and not just indiscriminately, indicates 
a knowledge of at least the outlines of frequency analysis."
Obviously, the more ciphertext symbols relative to plaintext 
symbols the easier it  is to disguise the structural properties of the plain­
text through enciphering. Each plaintext symbol could have many ciphertext 
encipherings, in order to illustrate this consider a plaintext alphabet 
of 26 symbols and a ciphertext alphabet of 1024 symbols (10 b its ) .
In it ia lly  each plaintext symbol would have as many ciphers inversely 
propostional to its frequency in the language (see Figure 3 ). Notice that 
the single letter frequency of the ciphertext is nearly constant (compare 
Figure 4 to Figure la) relative to its frequency in the plaintext thereby not 
providing any single letter frequency information for the cryptanalyst.
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b) Digram Frequency
ETOANIRSHDLCFUMPYWGBVKX JQZ
TIAIEFTEHAVTTAHEHRIACNAEIT  
HNNONOIRETEEHTARIELROCLVTE 
EGDNTROERERRAITSSSLENELEHD
FP-3444
Figure 1. Various Frequency Distributions for English
6A Simple Homophonie Substitution Cipher
Key
Plaintext--
Ciphertext:
ABCDEFGHIJ KLMNOPQRSTUVWXY Z
CRYPTOGRAM5678 9BDEFHIJ KLNQ 
1 2 3 4 S 
U V W X 
Z
Plaintext:
Ciphertext:
Messaae
THIS IS A SECRET MESSAGE 
HRAF AFC FTYE2H 7VFF1GZ
FP-3445
Figure 2
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A Homophonic Substitution Cipher Generated in 
Inverse Proportion to Frequency in Plaintext
Plaintext Symbol; A B C D E F G H I J K L M
Number of Cipher Symbols: 81 13 31 4313329 14 61 71 2 5 38 27
N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  
15 85 22 2 70 65 93 28 10 15 3 15 1
Figure 3
Single Cipher Frequency 
for Homophonic Cipher
E T O A N I R S H D L C F U M P Y W G B V K X J Q Z
FP -3 4 4 9
Figure 4
8However, as noted above, the cryptanalyst uses other techniques 
for breaking codes. The cryptanalyst looks for the most deviant structural 
features f i r s t .  Consider, for example, the abnormal reversal frequency of 
ER in Figure le . I f  this reversal can be located in the ciphertext the 
cryptanalyst is much closer to breaking the code. In contrast, he would 
not look for the reversal OF since there are many other reversals with 
nearly the same frequency occurrence. The crucial point to remember is 
that it  is only the abnormal or deviant frequencies that can be used for 
clues. Clearly, i f  a ll  measurements of the ciphertext yielded nearly fla t 
distributions as in Figure 4 there would be no information gained from 
those measurements.
Now let us generalize the homophonic technique to flatten the
other curves illustrated in Figure 1. This is easier said than accomplished,
s
since adjusting one curve to be fla tte r  w ill generally result in making 
another one more curved.
Let us return to the earlier generalized homophonic enciphering 
hypothesis and modify it  somewhat to allow for more f le x ib i l ity . Before 
we wanted the curve resulting from single letter enciphering to be nearly 
f la t .  I f  we lessen this restriction  somewhat and allow for some distribu­
tion but not nearly as much we can avoid the abnormal or deviant frequencies 
that are normally used for clues on a ll the measurements found in Figure 1. 
Figure 5 gives one such homophonic cipher.
The technique used to generate this code is fa ir ly  simple. The 
frequencies are adjusted as for the code in Figure 3, and the corresponding 
frequency charts can be generated for the other measurement of the cipher- 
text. Next, the most deviant frequency in any measurement is examined. I f ,
9A Generalized Homophonie Cipher
Plaintext Symbol: A B C D E F G H I  J K L M
Number of Cipher Symbols: 73 10 24 3412923 10 52 77 2 4  43 22
N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  
27 89 19 12 80 72 87 45 8 13 2 13 2
FP-3450
F igure 5
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for example, it  is a reversal frequency the corresponding number of cipher 
symbols used for each of the constituent symbols is raised accordingly. The 
process is repeated until the frequency curves are satisfactory . I f  there 
is no convergence the process can be started over again taking care to 
choose different measurements f i r s t ,  I f  after a number of attempts are 
made appropriate curves cannot be gotten, it  might be necessary to increase 
the number of ciphertext symbols by increasing the number of bits used to 
represent each symbol.
A cipher successfully generated in the manner described has a ll 
the desirable features for computational cryptography set forth above. An 
extremely simple enciphering and deciphering scheme can be used since this 
is a substitution type cipher. A sample scheme w ill be given. With regard 
to the ab ility  to adjust the cipher to meet security needs one need only 
increase the number of bits used to represent each ciphertext symbol 
(e ffe ctiv e ly , increasing the ciphertext alphabet). Since there is one 
ciphertext symbol for each plaintext symbol the messages can be of arbitrary 
length. An error in one symbol does not extend errors even to adjacent 
symbols of the message; thereby keeping losses of information to a minimum. 
Note in particular that since it  is a substitution cipher the 'in tegrity  
through editing ' condition is met. That is , strings (including individual 
characters) of enciphered message may be moved with respect to each other 
without going through a deciphering and reenciphering process. This property 
makes it  invaluable for large dynamic data-bases.
The length of the message only increases with the security needed. 
For a typical low security cipher 8-bits should be su fficien t for a 64
11
symbol plaintext alphabet. A homophonie cipher can e ffe ctiv e ly  destroy 
a ll standard language frequency information as shown in Figure 1. In 
addition, information in ciphered form may be received by the computer 
from a terminal and be edited without it  ever being deciphered at the 
central fa c i l it y . As mentioned earlier the device to encipher the plain­
text message need not be very complex. Consider a key of 256 characters; 
each of the 64 characters appears in the key the number of times desired 
for the particular application (see Figure 6 ). The key is loaded into a 
256 word memory. Deciphering consists of returning the contents of the 
address specified by the 8-b it cipher. Enciphering involves generating an 
address randomly and then searching sequentially until a matching character 
is found and then transmitting its address (see Figure 7).
The amount of secrecy needed can be controlled by the number of 
b its . So, for instance with 9 bits there would be 418 remaining bit 
patterns; with 10 bits it  would be 984, etc . Each additional b it increases 
the security.
6, Additional Problems Associated With Computational Cryptography
There are a number of additional problems associated with keeping 
sensitive information secure in computer systems. These include the following: 
1« The decoded message problem. This comes about when a block of 
decoded or unenciphered message is known by the analyst. With 
this type o f information available very few cipher systems are 
sa fe .
The limited syntax problem. When dealing with limited languages 
such as programming languages the analyst can break the cipher
2 .
Deciphering the Homophonie Cipher
Address Memory
12
Ciphertext
Character
10110011
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10101110 
10101111 
10110000 
10110001 
10110010 
-1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
FP-3446
C
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Enciphering the Homophonie Cipher
Address Memory
O O O O O O O O
1) Generate Random 
Address-.
2)
1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1
Search sequentially 
for Plaintext 
Character s '
P
10101110 
10101111 
10110000 
10110001 
10110010 
10110011
3) Ciphertext is 
the address 
of match
/ 10110001
ilium  0
FP-3447
Figure 7
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by knowing the restrictive  properties of the language involved.
3. The arithmetic problem. I f  the ciphered text is not to be 
decoded inside the computer arithmetic operations cannot be 
performed.
4« The overlapping access problem. When different individuals have 
access to the same ciphered data and yet do not want common 
access to other enciphered data.
It is hoped that this paper w ill influence in some way the designers of
future computer systems by showing that simple techniques can be used for
e ffectiv e ly  limiting the access of information to only those who should
have access to it .  A ju stifica tion  of the effectiveness of this homophonic
cipher system on a mathematical basis using techniques developed by 
13Shannon w ill be described in a subsequent paper.
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